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Abstract
This paper investigates whether short-term momentum and long-term
reversal may emerge from the wealth reallocation process taking place in
speculative markets. We assume that there are two classes of investors who
trade long-lived assets by holding constantly rebalanced portfolios based on
their beliefs. Provided beliefs, and thus portfolios, are sufficiently diversi-
fied, all investors survive in the long-run and, due to waves of mispricing,
the resulting equilibrium returns exhibit long-term reversal. If, moreover,
asset dividends are positively correlated, investors’ profitable trades become
positively correlated too, thus generating short-term momentum in equilib-
rium returns. We use the model to replicate the performance of the Winners
and Losers portfolios highlighted by the empirical literature and to provide
insights on how to improve upon them. Finally, we show that dividend
positive autocorrelation is positively related to momentum and negatively
related to reversal while diversity of beliefs is positively related to both
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1 Introduction
The cornerstone of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is the martingale property:
properly discounted and risk adjusted asset returns are equal, in expectation, to
the risk free rate, no matter the information set on which they are conditioned.
However, in the last decades, several empirical studies showed how two peculiar
patterns seem to be quite common: short-term momentum and long-term reversal.
According to the former, excess returns tend to be positive (negative) after positive
(negative) excess returns over recent lags, while according to the latter, they tend
to be negative (positive) after positive (negative) excess returns over distant lags.1
In this paper, we explore whether the two phenomena may be due to the wealth
reallocation process that takes place in speculative markets. In particular, we as-
sume that agents invest in long-lived assets using constantly rebalanced portfolios
derived in accordance with their beliefs. Due to beliefs heterogeneity, agents take
different positions and thus gain or lose wealth depending on dividend payments.
The ensuing wealth dynamics amplify price movements, generating positive capital
gains after high dividends and negative otherwise. We investigate whether such
return dynamics can be responsible for short-run momentum and long-run reversal
in equilibrium. We also investigate the existence and nature of profitable portfolio
strategies and how momentum and reversal react to variations in the parameters
of the economy, such as beliefs dispersion and dividend autocorrelation.
On the modeling side, we make a number of choices to simplify the set-up
and, at the same time, have an asset price process that is the Walrasian equi-
librium outcome of a financial market with heterogeneous traders. We consider
an endowment economy in discrete time with two possible states of the world in
every period and an infinite horizon. The aggregate endowment is spanned by two
long-lived risky assets and each asset pays the dividend only in one of the two
states. A key assumption is that dividends, and thus states, follow a Markov pro-
cess where the probability that an asset pays dividends is higher if the same asset
payed dividends in the last period. Asset prices are determined in equilibrium in a
competitive market with two (classes of) agents. Portfolio and saving decisions are
kept simple. Agents’ saving rate is constant and homogeneous while demands in
assets are derived as constantly rebalanced portfolios. These portfolios are derived
in accordance to each agent’s beliefs as Subjectively Generalized Kelly portfolios
(Evstigneev et al., 2008; Bottazzi et al., 2017), or “bet your beliefs” as in Kelly
(1956) and Breiman (1961).2
1See Section 2 for an account of the related literature.
2As we shall make clear in Section 4, these portfolio and saving rules correspond to those of
an agent who maximizes the expected discounted stream of consumption when her beliefs get
influenced by market prices, see Bottazzi et al. (2017), or the related work on the Fractional
Kelly rule in heterogeneous agent economies Kets et al. (2014), Bottazzi and Giachini (2016),
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Beliefs are assumed to be constant (agents think that the state process is
i.i.d.) and biased enough to sustain long-run heterogeneity. This is a behavioral
assumption consistent with the view that agents use trading rules that do not
reflect all the complexity of reality (see e.g. Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer
and Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). In the words of Daniel and
Titman (1999): “individuals have limited processing ability, and hence use vague,
ad hoc rules to translate the information they receive into estimates of cash flows
and firm valuations”.
In this setting, we are able to derive the explicit stochastic difference equation
underlying the price process and completely characterize asset conditional excess
returns. As a main result we show that the reallocation of wealth generated by
market selection forces, together with the underlying Markov process and belief
heterogeneity, is responsible for both short-term momentum and long-term rever-
sal. The effects occur even if agents do not revise their beliefs when a particular
state comes out. In fact, the fundamental mechanisms that underlies our results
is the interplay between two forces: the positive autocorrelation in the dividend
process, which triggers momentum, and the mispricing that may occur under be-
lief heterogeneity, causing return reversal. While the former effect is constant, the
latter increases when several states of the same type appear. In the short-run,
the positive autocorrelation overwhelms the mispricing and the result is short-
term momentum. Conversely, when a long sequence of high dividend payments
is realized, the mispricing becomes the strongest force and long-term reversal is
observed.
Our analysis has several implications. First, we show how, conditioning on past
returns, it is possible to replicate the superior empirical performance of the Win-
ners portfolio over the Losers portfolio in the short-run and of the Losers portfolio
over the Winners portfolio in the long-run.3 Second, we also show how to use the
joint information of returns and prices to improve upon these portfolios and build
short-selling constrained portfolios that deliver a positive expected return in every
period. Third, we prove that, removing the short-selling constraint, it is possible
to build a zero-cost portfolio that provide a positive expected payoff in every pe-
riod.4 Fourth, we find that increasing the dispersion of beliefs affects positively
both short-run momentum and long-run reversal. Fifth, increasing the strength
of dividends positive autocorrelation affects positively short-run momentum and
negatively long-run reversal. Those findings, which have been in part confirmed
by empirical studies, can provide new hints for future empirical research.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature.
Bottazzi and Giachini (2017), and Dindo and Massari (2017).
3See section 2 for more details on empirical results concerning Winners-Losers portfolios.
4In doing so, we neglect the price impact of such portfolio strategies. Their inclusion in the
set of actually trading strategies is in the scope of future works.
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In Section 3, we introduce the formal definitions of momentum and reversal used
throughout our analysis. In Section 4, we present our formal model. In Section
5, we investigate how and under which conditions the model produces momentum
and reversal. In Section 6, we study the implications of our model. Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature Review
Several empirical studies have investigated momentum and reversal in asset re-
turns, here we briefly report those that are most significant for our analysis. The
earliest empirical research on the topic focuses on observing the returns of port-
folios built considering stocks with particularly good or bad performances over
previous periods. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) consider two portfolios: the
Losers portfolio, made by stocks with poor performances over the previous period
(36-60 months), and the Winners portfolio, made by stocks with high performances
over the same period. They show that Losers portfolio systematically outperforms
Winners portfolio over the following 36-60 months. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
find that strategies which buy stocks that have showed good performances in the
past 3-12 months and sell stocks that have, instead, showed poor performances in
the past 3-12 months generate positive returns in the following 3-12 months.
Relying on similar techniques, several contributions enriched and complemented
those findings. In particular, Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Bernard (1992) find
that, depending on observable public events, stocks abnormal returns tend to move
in the same direction as the initial event and to keep the trend for the following
60-180 trading days. Chopra et al. (1992) confirm the results of De Bondt and
Thaler, showing also how the mean-reverting behavior is distinct from tax-loss sell-
ing effects and that it is stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms. Chan et al.
(1996) show how both the most recent earning surprise and the past six-month re-
turn are able to predict drift in future returns. Daniel and Titman (1999) find that
momentum effects are stronger for growth stocks than value stocks. Moskowitz
and Grinblatt (1999) find evidence of momentum in portfolios built at the industry
level. Hong et al. (2000) show that momentum profits are negatively correlated to
firm size and to analyst coverage. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) confirm their pre-
vious findings and also find evidence for return reversal from 48 to 60 months after
the portfolio formation. Verardo (2009) finds that momentum profits are larger for
those portfolios composed by stocks characterized by higher belief heterogeneity,
using dispersion of analyst forecasts as proxy. Asness et al. (2013) find evidence
for momentum profits across eight diverse markets and asset classes, expanding
the previous results of Rouwenhorst (1998).
As a general criticism with respect to approaches based on portfolio compari-
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son, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Lewellen (2002) point out that the return of a
portfolio built considering previous performances can be particularly high (or low)
because returns are autocorrelated, or a form of cross-serial correlation among the
securities that form the portfolio exists (lead-lag effect). Indeed Lewellen (2002)
shows that the negative cross-correlation among assets may account for a signif-
icant share of momentum profits. At the same time, other empirical investiga-
tions have explored the time-series dimension rather than the portfolio dimension.
Moskowitz et al. (2012) find strong “time series momentum” (autocorrelation in
returns) that partially reverts in the long-run for several future and forward con-
tracts. Balvers et al. (2000), Gropp (2004), and Mukherji (2011) find evidence of
mean reverting behavior in return time-series over lags of 12-60 months. Mukherji
also suggests that this effect have weakened in recent years for large firms, while it
persists for small firms. All these contributions confirm and extend the previous
findings of Poterba and Summers (1988), Jegadeesh (1990) and Cutler et al. (1991)
about positive autocorrelation of returns between 1 and 12 months and negative
autocorrelation between 13 and 24 months.
The theoretical explanations of momentum and reversal mainly belong to the
behavioral finance literature, that links the former to under-reaction and the latter
to over-reaction of markets to news, caused by investors cognitive biases. Barberis
et al. (1998) assume that when news arrive in the market, the representative
agent under-reacts, i.e. slowly revises its expectations, so that the price gradually
adapts to the new fundamental. This slow adaptation is identified with short-
term momentum. At the same time, when a long enough sequence of news of
the same type (either good or bad) occurs, the agent overreacts, i.e. becomes
increasingly optimistic or pessimistic, so that prices ”overshoot” their fundamental
value. This tendency is corrected in the long-run, generating what is recognized
as long-term reversal. The particular way in which their representative agent
changes its beliefs is justified by means of conservatism and representativeness
biases. Such underlying story is in part challenged by Daniel et al. (1998) and
Hong and Stein (1999). Daniel et al. (1998), still employing a representative agent
model but different cognitive biases (overconfidence and biased self-attribution)
and two types of news (private and public), show that short-term momentum can
be generated also by agents’ continuing over-reaction. Hong and Stein (1999)
instead identify in the slow circulation of news among news-watcher traders the
roots of under-reaction and the following short-term momentum, while long-term
reversal is caused by the action of a different class of traders (who overreact making
the price overshoot) coupled with the reaction of the news-watchers (that makes
the price go back to the fundamental). A following paper by the same authors
(Hong and Stein, 2007) predicts that disagreement (hence heterogeneity of beliefs)
not only leads to momentum profits, but the magnitude of those profits is positively
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related to the dispersion of opinions.
Differently from the behavioral finance explanation of momentum and reversal,
in our model beliefs are not revised when news arrive in the market. By focusing
on the wealth reallocation process that takes place in speculative markets, our
analysis highlights a complementary source of momentum and reversal that may
reinforce the effects of investors under- and over-reaction. Other works have in-
vestigated the role of competitive markets in selecting among trading strategies,
providing a theoretical test of the Market Selection Hypothesis of Friedman (1953),
at least for financial markets. The seminal contribution in the area is Blume and
Easley (1992). Our model, by analyzing a discrete time infinite horizon economy
populated by agents with heterogeneous rebalanced portfolios of long-lived assets,
is close to Evstigneev et al. (2008) and Bottazzi et al. (2017). Other contribu-
tions in the literature considers the outcome of market selection with endogenous
portfolios both in discrete time (Sandroni, 2000; Blume and Easley, 2006; Jouini
and Napp, 2006) and in continuous time (Jouini and Napp, 2007; Yan, 2008; Cvi-
tanic´ et al., 2012). Within this Market Selection literature, other models achieve
long-run heterogeneity as a result of incomplete markets (Blume and Easley, 2006;
Beker and Chattopadhyay, 2010; Coury and Sciubba, 2012), non-tradable labor
income (Cogley et al., 2013; Cao, 2017), ambiguity aversion (Condie, 2008; Guerd-
jikova and Sciubba, 2015), asymmetric and costly information (Sciubba, 2005),
non-converging learning (Sandroni, 2005; Beker and Espino, 2011), recursive pref-
erences (Borovicˇka, 2015; Dindo, 2015), solvency constraints (Beker and Espino,
2015). In particular, Beker and Espino (2015) highlight the role that belief hetero-
geneity and limited enforceability may play for generating short-term momentum
and long-term reversal.
3 Excess Returns, Momentum and Reversal
As illustrated in the literature review, the definition and investigation of momen-
tum and reversal has taken significantly different forms. Here, we introduce the
formal definition based on the time-series dimension of asset returns that we shall
use in our analysis.
Consider a long-lived asset (a stock) traded in period t ∈ N in a competitive
financial market. Call Pt its date-t price and Dt its date-t dividend. In Section 4,
we shall derive the price process (Pt)t∈N in equilibrium, starting from agents’ asset
demands and imposing market clearing. For the moment it is enough to con-
sider it together with the information filtration (It)t∈N it generates and the related
probability triple with measure P. The excess return between dates t and t + 1
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reads
rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Dt+1 − Pt
Pt
− rf,t ,
where rf,t is the risk-free rate. Since all returns will be computed in excess of the
risk-free rate, we may drop the adjective excess in what follows.
In benchmark asset pricing models, the equilibrium price process is “fair”, that
is, conditional on any event which contains information up to t, expected returns
are zero:5
E[rt+1|It] = 0 for all It ∈ It . (1)
Eq. (1) can fail in many ways. We shall say that the asset price process exhibits
momentum when, after a history of returns with a given sign, the expected return
has the same sign. On the contrary, a price process exhibits reversal when, after
a history returns with a given sign, the expected return has the opposite sign.
To formalize momentum and reversal, we define elements of It with returns of
a given sign. Given what is known at time t, for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, we define
the set of events with last j returns all positive:
R+t (j) = {rt > 0, rt−1 > 0, . . . , rt−j+1 > 0} ∈ It .
Likewise, when the last j returns are all negative we have the set
R−t (j) = {rt < 0, rt−1 < 0, . . . , rt−j+1 < 0} ∈ It .
Since we can have either positive or negative returns, and the length of returns
with the same sign can vary from 1 to j, we need to distinguish momentum and
reversal for all these cases. We start with the following,
Definition 3.1. The asset prices process (Pt) exhibits momentum of order j in t
after a history of positive returns and conditionally on the price Pt−j+1 if
E[rt+1|R+t (j), Pt−j+1] > 0 .
Likewise, (Pt) exhibits momentum of order j in t after a history of negative returns
and conditionally on the price Pt−j+1 if
E[rt+1|R−t (j), Pt−j+1] < 0 .
The asset prices process (Pt) exhibits reversal of order j in t after a history of
positive returns and conditionally on the price Pt−j+1 if
E[rt+1|R+t (j), Pt−j+1] < 0 .
5We shall show that this is the case in Section 4.1. We anticipate that having no aggregate
risk is crucial for the result, otherwise returns should be risk adjusted.
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Likewise, (Pt) exhibits reversal of order j in t after a history of negative returns
and conditionally on the price Pt−j+1 if
E[rt+1|R−t (j), Pt−j+1] > 0 .
Definition 3.1 distinguishes between positive and negative returns and allows
the effects to depend on the initial price level. Throughout the analysis, it is
convenient to analyze both momentum and reversal using a measure that gets rid
of the reference to the sign of previous returns. We do this by averaging with
respect to histories with positive or negative returns.6
Definition 3.2. Let
φt(j, Pt−j+1) = E[sgn(rt)rt+1|R+t (j) ∪ R−t (j), Pt−j+1] . (2)
The price process (Pt) exhibits momentum of order j in t, given a price Pt−j+1, if
φt(j, Pt−j+1) > 0 .
The price process (Pt) exhibits reversal of order j in t, given a price Pt−j+1, if
φt(j, Pt−j+1) < 0 .
It might be useful to eliminate the reference to the initial price level and to
have a definition of momentum and reversal that depends only on t and j, the
number of previous periods with returns having the same sign.
Definition 3.3. Fixing t and j ≤ t let
Φt(j) =
∫
φt(j, P )dFt−j+1(P ) = E[sgn(rt)rt+1|R+t (j) ∪ R−t (j)] , (3)
where Ft(P ) is the cumulative distribution function of Pt.
The price process (Pt) exhibits momentum of order j in t, if
Φt(j) > 0
The price process (Pt) exhibits reversal of order j in t, if
Φt(j) < 0
6A similar aggregation is performed in the behavioral finance literature, see e.g. Barberis
et al. (1998).
8
For convenience, we also define
φ∞(Pt−j+1) = lim
j→∞
φt(j, Pt−j+1) and Φ∞ = lim
j→∞
Φt(j) .
In what follows we shall build a simple asset market model where, under divi-
dend positive autocorrelation and long-run heterogeneity triggered by persistent
disagreement, equilibrium prices exhibits momentum for low js and reversal for
high js.
4 The Model
In this section, we introduce a simple model that allows for the investigation of
momentum and reversal in a financial market for long-lived assets with heteroge-
neous agents. The key element of our model is the wealth reallocation process that
takes place in speculative markets. Thus our model belongs to the market selection
literature stemming from Blume and Easley (1992). By analyzing a discrete time
infinite horizon economy populated by agents with heterogeneous rebalanced port-
folios of risky assets, our model is close to Evstigneev et al. (2008) and Bottazzi
et al. (2017).
In a nutshell, we consider an endowment economy with two agents whose ag-
gregate endowment is spanned by two long-lived assets. Agents trade assets using
simple rules, i.e. constantly rebalanced portfolios, derived in accordance with their
beliefs. Due to belief heterogeneity, agents’ positions are speculative.
First, we set-up the model and derive the equilibrium asset price process (Pt)
as a function of agents’ portfolio and saving rules. Next, we characterize the
properties of the prices process under different assumptions on agents’ behaviors.
In Section 5, we use the model to provide conditions for the occurrence of both
short-run momentum and long-run reversal, according to the formal definitions of
Section 3.
Time is discrete and in each date t ∈ N one of the two possible states of
the world occurs, st ∈ S = {1, 2}. st = {s1, . . . , st} denotes a partial history of
states till t and Σ is the space of infinite paths of states σ. (Ft) is the natural
filtration and F is the σ-algebra generated by this filtration. All variables that we
shall introduce –asset demands, prices, dividends– are adapted to the information
filtration (Ft). In order to ease the notation, their dependence on σ, and thus on
partial histories st, is often dropped.
The economy is populated by N = 2 (classes of) agents whose aggregate en-
dowment in t ∈ N0 = N ∪ {0}, Yt, is measured in units of the consumption good,
the nume´raire. The aggregate endowment is constant, so that there is no aggregate
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risk, and without loss of generality we set Yt = 1 for all t ∈ N0. The aggregate
endowment is spanned by K = 2 long-lived risky assets. Both assets are in unitary
supply. Thus, if Dk,t is the dividend payed by asset k ∈ {1, 2} at the beginning of
period t we have
D1,t +D2,t = 1 , for all (t, σ) ∈ N× Σ.
Assets dividend are perfectly anti-correlated, namely asset 1 (2) pays a dividend
only when state one 1 (2) is realized. We have
Dk,t(s
t) = ∆k,st , for all (t, σ) ∈ N× Σ and k = 1, 2,
where ∆k,j is the Kronecker’s delta. State 1 is the good state (good news) for asset
1 and the bad state (bad news) for assets 2, and the other way around.
In every period each agent uses her wealth, that is, dividends and the resale
value of assets bought in the previous period, to consume and invest. We denote
with Cit agent i consumption and with W
i
t agent i pre-consumption wealth, in
units of the nume´rarire, in the generic (t, σ). We express both consumption and
portfolio decisions in date t as a function of wealth. In particular, δit is the fraction
of wealth that agent i saves for investment and (xi1,t, x
i
2,t) is his portfolio decision in
(t, σ). To ensure that consumption is positive in each period and that the budget
constraint is satisfied, we assume the following
R1 δit ∈ (0, 1) and xi1,t + xi2,t = 1, for all (t, σ) ∈ N0 × Σ and i = 1, 2.
Naming Pt = (P1,t, P2,t) the vector of date-t asset prices, agent i’s budget constraint
in (t, σ) is
W it =
2∑
k=1
(Pk,t + ∆k,st)
δit−1x
i
k,t−1W
i
t−1
Pk,t−1
, for i = 1, 2 . (4)
Given asset demands, and having assumed unitary supply, prices are determined
in equilibrium. Using portfolio decision, the market clearing conditions in (t, σ)
leads to
Pk,t = δ
1
t x
1
k,tW
1
t + δ
2
t x
2
k,tW
2
t , for k = 1, 2 . (5)
Equations (4-5) define the coupled dynamics of asset prices and agents’ wealth as
a function of agents investment and portfolio decisions. Specific assumptions of
agents’ behavior shall be taken starting from the next section.
Finally, we go back to the dividend process and assume that states of nature
follow a Markov process. We take P as the probability measure on (Σ,F) such
that the coordinate process (st)
∞
t=0 is Markov with unitary memory and transition
matrix
Π =
[
1/2 + λ 1/2− λ
1/2− λ 1/2 + λ
]
, λ ∈ (0, 1/2) . (6)
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Given Π, the invariant distribution is
pi∗ =
[
1/2
1/2
]
(7)
Having Markov states is the main difference with respect to Evstigneev et al. (2008)
and Bottazzi et al. (2017), where states of nature follow a general i.i.d. process.
As we shall explain, the difference is key for the emergence of momentum. The
i.i.d. case can be recovered by setting λ = 0 in (6).
4.1 Rational Pricing
Under homogeneous initial endowment, homogeneous discount factor δ,7 and ra-
tional expectations, rational equilibrium prices can be recovered imposing market
clearing conditions when portfolio and saving decision of each agent i = 1, 2 solve
max
δit, x
i
k,t; ∀k,t,σ
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
δtUi
(
Cit
)]
subject to
Cit = (1− δit)W it , ∀(t, σ) ∈ N0 × Σ;
W it =
2∑
k=1
(Pk,t + ∆k,st)
δit−1x
i
k,t−1W
i
t−1
Pk,t−1
, ∀(t, σ) ∈ N× Σ;
W i0 =
1
2
2∑
k=1
Pk,0 +
1
2
;
where we have also assumed that each agent starts with an endowment of 1/2
consumption good. Solving the former for each agent and adding the market
clearing (5) leads to equilibrium saving rules, portfolio rules, and asset prices. In
particular, a constant aggregate endowment and no-aggregate risk imply that both
agents use the same saving rule and hold homogeneous portfolios irrespectively of
their per-period utility. Using the superscript RE (“Rational Expectation”) to
label the quantities involved in this exercise, the saving rate is
δREt = δ for all (t, σ) ∈ N0 × Σ .
and the fraction of wealth invested in asset 1 in (t, σ) is
xRE1,t (st = 1) =
1/2 + λ− 2λδ
1− 2λδ , x
RE
1,t (st = 2) =
1/2− λ
1− 2λδ . (8)
7The same analysis holds even when agents have a different discount factor. The only differ-
ence is that the risk-free rate depends on agents relative wealth. In the long-run, only the agent
with the highest discount factor has positive wealth, and thus determines prices.
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The amount invested in asset 2 follows by R1. The price of asset 1 in (t, σ) is
PRE1,t (st = 1) =
δ
1− δ
1/2 + λ− 2λδ
1− 2λδ , P
RE
1,t (st = 2) =
δ
1− δ
1/2− λ
1− 2λδ . (9)
Given the symmetry of the model, PRE2,t (st = 1) = P
RE
1,t (st = 2) and P
RE
2,t (st = 2) =
PRE1,t (st = 1). The implied one period risk-free rate is constant and equal to
rf =
1− δ
δ
. (10)
If we normalize prices by their sum, the normalized price of asset k jumps between
xREk (1) and x
RE
k (2) depending on the realized state. Having assumed that states
follow a Markov process, equilibrium portfolio rules and asset prices are state
dependent.
Under rational expectations and with no aggregate risk, fair pricing holds. In
fact, for both assets k = 1, 2 we obtain
E[rk,t+1|It] = 0 for all (t, σ) ∈ N0 × Σ and for all It ∈ It , (11)
where (It) is the information filtration generated by prices.
8 Equation (11) and
the tower property of conditional expectation imply that all the quantities defined
in Section 3 concerning momentum and reversal are zero for all dates t, orders j,
and initial prices Pt−j+1. When all agents are fully rational neither momentum
nor reversal can occur in equilibrium.
4.2 Simple rules and long-run heterogeneity
Given that momentum and reversal are empirical regularities, we move away from
assuming that agents have rational expectations. We do so in three ways.
First, we assume that agents do not use the correct probabilistic model but
instead believe that states of the world follow an i.i.d. process. The key feature is
that agents underestimate the positive autocorrelation of good and bad news. As
we shall show, this is key for generating short-term momentum.
Second, we assume that agents save a constant proportion of their wealth and
hold constantly rebalanced portfolios, derived in accordance with their beliefs.
This assumptions enables us to give an analytic expression for the stochastic dif-
ference equation that generates the equilibrium price process, along the lines of
Bottazzi et al. (2017). The expression is crucial for the explicit valuation of con-
ditional expected returns.
8As we shall characterize later, (It) can be restricted to (Ft) for our purposes, see the beginning
of Section 5.
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Third, we shall assume that beliefs are sufficiently diversified, so that, almost
surely, both classes of agents have positive wealth in the long-run. As we shall
explain, having persistent heterogeneity is key for generating long-term reversal.9
Starting from beliefs, we assume that in every t ∈ N0, each agent i = 1, 2
assigns a probability 0 < pii < 1 to the event “asset 1 pays the dividend in date
t+1”. 1−pii is the probability she assigns to the event “asset 2 pays the dividend in
t+ 1”. Moreover, each agent allocates to asset k a fraction of wealth proportional
to the likelihood that asset k pays the dividend. Agents have also a constant and
homogeneous saving rate equal to δ. Formally
R2 (xi1,t, x
i
2,t; δ
i
t) = (pi
i, 1− pii; δ) for all (t, σ) ∈ N0 × Σ and i = 1, 2.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that 0 < pi2 < pi1 < 1. Agent 1 assigns
a higher probability than agent 2 to the event that asset 1 pays the dividend, and
the other way around for asset 2.
When the dividend process is i.i.d. and agent beliefs are correct, Evstigneev
et al. (2008) name the portfolio rule in R2 the Generalized Kelly Rule. The rule
coincides with the one used in equilibrium by a representative agent with correct
beliefs. Bottazzi et al. (2017) analyze such a rule for general beliefs and name
it Subjective Generalized Kelly. They show that the resulting wealth and price
dynamics is such that prices are strictly positive and exclude arbitrages. Even if
this rule is in general not optimal, Bottazzi et al. (2017) link it with an endogenous
intertemporally optimal rule using the concept of effective beliefs. Basically, the
price process implied by agents behaving in accordance to this rule is the same as
in a log-economy where agents’ beliefs are affected by asset prices, the higher the
price the higher the belief that the asset pays the dividend.
Since agents’ saving rate δ matches the agents’ discount factor in the rational
expectation case, the equilibrium risk-free rate is still (10). Moreover, the total
wealth in the model sums up to 1/(1− δ) and prices sum up to δ/(1− δ). Defining
pt = P1,t(1 − δ)/δ as the normalized price of asset 1 and wt = W 1t (1 − δ) as the
normalized wealth of agent 1, under R2 the dynamics of wealth and prices in (4-5)
can be rewritten as
wt = wt−1
(
δpt + (1− δ)∆1,st
pt−1
pi1 +
1− δpt − (1− δ)∆1,st
1− pt−1 (1− pi
1)
)
,
pt = pi
1wt + pi
2(1− wt) .
Using both equations, we find the analytic expression of the stochastic difference
9The same intuition does generally apply to all models characterized by long-run heterogene-
ity, see the discussion below Corollary 4.1.
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Figure 1: Comparison of price patterns for a given realization of the underlying
process. The values used in the plot are pi1 = 0.8, pi2 = 0.2, δ = 0.9 and λ = 0.2.
equation that generates the price process (pt)t∈N0 under belief heterogeneity
pt = pt−1 +
(1− δ)(pi1 − pt−1)(pt−1 − pi2)(∆1,st − pt−1)
pt−1(1− pt−1)− δ(pi1 − pt−1)(pt−1 − pi2) . (12)
Figure 1 shows the (normalized) price patterns of asset 1 for a representative path
σ both when agents have rational expectations, eq. (9), and when agents invest
according to R2, eq. (12). Prices generated by (12) fluctuate in the interval (pi2, pi1)
depending on the realized dividend. When st = 1, eq. (12) implies that the price
of asset 1 increases while the price of asset 2 decreases. Since we have assumed
that pi1 > pi2, agent 1 has a higher stake in asset 1 than agent 2. Therefore, a good
news for asset 1 increases agent 1’s relative wealth and thus pushes asset 1 price
up. The contrary happens when st = 2. Starting from the same price x
RE
1 (2),
consider an interval of 5 good news for asset 1. If all agents are rational, the
(normalized) price jumps in the first period to xRE1 (1) and remains there until bad
states arrive. If, instead, agents follow R2, the price keeps increasing because agent
1 keeps profiting from the trade. For the first two periods the price stays below
the rational one, an effect that could be referred to as market under-reaction. For
the subsequent 3 periods, however, the market seems to over-react. If 4 bad states
14
for asset 1 follow, agent 2 profits from the trade and the price slowly decreases,
showing a form of market under-reaction again.
According to the stochastic difference equation (12), the size of price changes
depends on the saving rule δ and on beliefs pi1 and pi2. Without a further restriction
on beliefs and saving rates, it could happen that, on average, the price increases
(decreases) so that eventually pt approaches pi
1 (pi2), meaning that only agent 1
(2) survives in the long run. Alternatively, beliefs could be such that both agents
survive in the long run and prices never settles down. As we shall see, in order to
have reversal it is key that both agents survive. The following proposition gives
conditions on beliefs and saving rates such that both agents have strictly positive
wealth in the long-run, P-a.s., and prices never settle down.
Proposition 4.1. Under R1-R2, if agents saving rates δ and beliefs pi1 and pi2
are such that, for every i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,(
1
2
+ λ
)
log
(
δpij + (1− δ)pii
pij
)
+
(
1
2
− λ
)
log
(
1− δpij − (1− δ)pii
1− pij
)
> 0 (13)
and(
1
2
− λ
)
log
(
δpij + (1− δ)pii
pij
)
+
(
1
2
+ λ
)
log
(
1− δpij − (1− δ)pii
1− pij
)
> 0 ,
(14)
then both agents survive:
Prob
{
lim sup
t→∞
wt > 0 and lim inf
t→∞
wt < 1
}
= 1 .
Moreover,
Prob
{
lim inf
t→∞
pt = pi
2 and lim sup
t→∞
pt = pi
1
}
= 1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, in order to obtain long-run heterogeneity, we shall assume the following.
R3 Given λ, beliefs pi1, pi2, and the saving rate δ are such that the inequalities
in (13) and (14) are satisfied.
Intuitively R3 is satisfied when agent 1 overestimates the probability that asset 1
pays the dividend while agent 2 overestimates the probability that asset 2 pays the
dividend. Stated in terms of portfolios, if both agents survive then their positions
must be sufficiently diversified.
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Corollary 4.1. Condition R3 implies that, for any given δ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈
(0, 1/2), it is pi1 > 1/2 + λ and pi2 < 1/2− λ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As surveyed in Section 2, the incumbent market selection literature has in-
vestigated other conditions under which heterogeneity is persistent in financial
markets, such as incomplete markets, solvency constraints, non-tradable income,
non-converging learning, ambiguity aversion, or recursive preferences. While tech-
nically different, all these conditions lead to similar effects on assets returns. The
advantage of deriving persistent heterogeneity assuming constantly rebalanced
portfolios, R2, is that the dynamics of prices, eq. (12), can be explicitly derived.
Such expression simplifies the computation of conditional expected returns and
allows for analytic results.
5 Momentum and Reversal
In this section, we use the characterization of the normalized price process (pt) in
(12) to show that prices exhibit short-run momentum if dividends are positively
correlated, λ > 0, and exhibit long-run reversal if agents’ heterogeneity is persis-
tent. Given the symmetry of our model we shall focus on asset 1. An important
preliminary observations is the following
Lemma 5.1. If st = 1 then r1,t > 0 and r2,t < 0 while if st = 2 then r1,t < 0 and
r2,t > 0
Proof. Since the sum of the prices of the two assets is constant and equal to the
inverse of the interest rate, the excess return of the two assets must have opposite
sign. Let consider asset 1. In terms of rescaled variables
r1,t =
pt − pt−1
pt−1
+
1− δ
δ
(
∆1,st
pt−1
− 1
)
.
According to (12), the difference pt − pt−1 is positive when st = 1 and negative
when st = 2. The same is true for ∆1,st/pt−1 − 1 and the statement follows.
Since a positive (negative) excess return for asset 1 in equivalent to observing
the realization of state 1 (state 2), both sets R+t (j) and R
+
t (j) are elements of the
primitive information filtration Ft other than of It. In other terms, conditioning on
the realization of a sequence of positive (negative) returns of asset 1 is equivalent
to conditioning on the realization of a sequence of states of the world 1 (2). The
opposite for asset 2.
We begin with the analysis of the simple case of agents having the same beliefs.
The same analysis is also informative of the case in which beliefs are such that,
eventually, only one agent has positive wealth.
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Figure 2: Comparison of asset 1’s expected excess returns for different values of
pi1 in the case of Homogeneous beliefs. The values used in the plot are δ = 0.95
and λ = 0.1.
5.1 Homogeneous beliefs
Set pi2 = pi1 in (12) to obtain pt = pi
1 for all (t, σ). In this case only the last return
matters, as it determines the probability of good or bad news. Thus there is no
difference in conditioning on longer histories of returns with the same sign. Hence
for any j, the expected return of asset 1 reads
E[r1,t+1|R+t (j), pi1] =
1− δ
δ
(
1/2 + λ
pi1
− 1
)
,
E[r1,t+1|R−t (j), pi1] =
1− δ
δ
(
1/2− λ
pi1
− 1
)
.
Figure 2 shows a representative example of the two quantities as functions of pi1.
In this economy there is no capital gain (prices are constant), hence the expected
excess return is just the expected dividend yield, a decreasing function of the price,
minus the risk-free rate. Given assets’ dividend process, the expected dividend
yield is proportional to conditional probabilities. It follows that the excess return
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after a given state hits zero when pi1 matches the probability that asset 1 pays the
dividend after that state. Thus, when 1/2−λ < pi1 < 1/2 +λ one has momentum
both after positive returns and after negative returns. When, instead, pi1 < 1/2−λ
one has momentum after positive returns and reversal after negative returns. The
opposite occurs when pi1 > 1/2 + λ.
Despite for extreme beliefs both momentum and reversal are possible, depend-
ing on the sign of the past return, the size of each expected return is such that
their averages φt(j, pi
1) and Φt(j) are positive. The result is momentum of all order
j and for any belief pi1.
Proposition 5.1. If agents behave according to R1−R2 with pi1 = pi2, then
φt(j, pi
1) =
1− δ
δ
λ
pi1
> 0 for all t ∈ N , j ≤ t , pi1 ∈ (0, 1) ,
and
Φt(j) = φt(j, pi
1) > 0 for all t ∈ N , j ≤ t , pi1 ∈ (0, 1) .
Proof. Due to the nature of the dividend process, the probability to observe a
sequence of j identical states is identical for the two states. For Lemma 5.1 this
also applies to a sequence of concordant returns, so that
φt(j, pi
1) =
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R+t (j), pi1]−
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R−t (j), pi1] .
The price distribution in this case is atomic: using the indicator function it is
Ft(p) = Ip>pi1 . Thus Φt(j) = φt(j, pi
1).
5.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs
Conditional expected returns in homogeneous economies are not consistent with
the empirical evidence. We would like to have both momentum and reversal, but
for different values of j. Thus, in what follows, we restrict the investigation to
beliefs satisfying R3 so that heterogeneity is persistent and prices keep fluctuating
as shown in Figure 1. To retain analytic tractability we shall consider two specific
cases: j = 1, as a proxy of short-run, and j →∞, as a proxy of long-run.
Short-run. The expressions for E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pt] and E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pt] can be
directly obtained from (12). Figure 3 reports their typical dependence on the
price pt. Notice that E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pt] is positive if pt < 1/2 + λ and negative
otherwise, meaning that one has momentum after a positive return when pt smaller
than 1/2 + λ and reversal otherwise. The situation is symmetric in the case of a
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Figure 3: E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pt] and E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pt] for different values of pt. The
values used in the plot are pi1 = 0.8, pi2 = 0.2, δ = 0.95 and λ = 0.1.
negative return: momentum occurs if pt > 1/2 − λ and reversal if pt < 1/2 − λ.
Thus for values of pt ∈ (1/2−λ, 1/2 +λ) one has momentum of order 1 both after
a positive return and after a negative return, while for pt outside such interval one
has momentum of order 1 only for positive or negative past returns, depending on
the exact position of pt, and reversal otherwise. However, even when pt < 1/2−λ or
pt > 1/2 +λ, the size of momentum is larger than the size of reversal. Thus, when
we average over past histories of returns to get φt(1, pt) and Φt(1), the momentum
effect prevails.
Proposition 5.2. If agents behave according to R1−R3, then
φt(1, pt) =
1− δ
δ
λ(1− pt)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 for all t ∈ N, pt ∈ (pi
1, pi2) ,
and
Φt(1) > 0 for all t ∈ N .
Proof. See Appendix C.
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We have established that a financial market populated by heterogeneous agents
exhibits short-run momentum. Under agents’ heterogeneity two are the forces
driving this result. The dividend yield, as in the homogeneous agent model of
Figure 2, and the capital gain. Provided prices are close to rational values and in
the bound (1/2− λ, 1/2 + λ), both forces push in the same direction: A dividend
payment is more likely to be followed by a dividend payment; and a price increase is
more likely to be followed by a price increase (and the other way round). Moreover,
the dividend payment effect is stronger that the price increase effect, so that a high
(low) dividend yield is more likely to be followed by high (low) dividend yield.
For positive returns, the momentum effect of dividend yield breaks when prices
are too far form their rational values, beyond 1/2 + λ. When prices are too large,
the dividend yield becomes too low and prices do not grow that much anymore.
However, in this case, the effect of negative news on momentum is quite strong, as
a negative return is more likely to be followed by a quite large negative return, so
that the momentum effect of the capital gain component becomes stronger. The
combined result is still momentum. The same argument holds for negative returns
when prices are too low. In this case, it is the contribution of positive returns that
leads to momentum.
Short-run momentum is decreasing in δ. An increase in agents saving rate
decreases the interest rates, thus increasing prices and decreasing dividend yields.
Moreover, an increase in agents saving rate decreases the size of price jumps:
agents effective portfolio positions become more and more alike and speculative
trade diminishes.10
Long-run. We turn to expected returns in the long-run. In the limit of the
length of histories being +∞, the initial normalized price pt does not play any
role. Indeed for Lemma 5.1, as the length of the sequence of good (bad) news
increases, the price tends toward its upper bound pi1 (lower bound pi2). Thus,
the expected excess returns after a sufficiently long sequence of good or bad news
are E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pi1] and E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pi2], respectively. Consider again Fig. 3.
Provided beliefs obey to R3, Corollary 4.1 guarantees that pi1 > 1/2 + λ and
pi2 < 1/2 − λ. Thus the price process exhibits reversal both after a very long
sequence of positive news and after a very long sequence of negative news. The
intuition is that after a long-sequence of positive news prices are close to pi1 and
10For a precise appraisal of the role of saving rates on agents’ portfolio positions we refer the
reader to the discussion on effective beliefs in Bottazzi et al. (2017). Intuitively, simple portfolio
rules can be matched into log-optimal portfolio rules by modifying agents’ beliefs into effective
beliefs. Higher values of saving rates imply a low interest rate and thus a high influence of
assets’ future dividends for their evaluation. The same pair of simple rules need closer effective
beliefs, and thus less severe speculation, in order to counterbalance the higher impact of future
dividends.
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Figure 4: Left panel: φt+j−1(j, pt) for different values of j and pt. Right panel:
Φt+j−1(j) for j = 1, 2, . . . , 60 with t = 10000, N = 1000000, δ = 0.95, pi1 =
0.8, pi2 = 0.2 and λ = 0.1. The dashed line represents the theoretical value for Φ∞.
the asset is overpriced, thus making the expected dividend yield low. Moreover,
given that we have imposed conditions for long-run heterogeneity, R3, the price is a
mean reverting process: when price are close to pi1 negative jumps are stronger than
positive jumps and expected capital gains are negative. The two effect together
lead to reversal, E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pi1] < 0. A similar effect occurs after a sequence of
negative news. In this case prices are close to pi2 so that the asset is underpriced.
Both dividend yields and capital gains are quite large in expectation and the result
is still reversal, E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pi2] > 0.
Proposition 5.3. If agents behave according to R1−R3, then
Φ∞ = φ∞(pt) =
1− δ
2δ
(
1/2 + λ
pi1
− 1/2− λ
pi2
)
< 0 , for all t ∈ N
Proof. See Appendix D.
Having long-run heterogeneity is crucial for the result because it links the
occurrence of long histories of returns with the same sign to waves of severe mis-
pricing. In our set-up, waves of mispricing are caused by the wealth accumulation
process when agents have incorrect, and diverse enough, beliefs. A sequence of
positive news gives more weight to agents with optimistic beliefs while a sequence
of negative news gives more weights to agents with pessimistic beliefs.
Numerical exploration. The price evolution (12) can be iterated to compute
the functions φt+j−1(j, pt) for any j. In Figure 4, we report the result for δ = 0.95,
pi1 = 0.8, pi2 = 0.2 and λ = 0.1. Momentum occurs in the short-run for any pt.
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As the order j increases, the size of momentum decreases, until reversal appears.
The magnitude of the effects and the order j after which reversal appears depend
on the initial price pt. Since the values used for the example in the left panel of
Figure 4 satisfy R3, prices fluctuate between pi2 and pi1. Thus we can compute
Φt+j−1(j) using numerical techniques to obtain the cumulative distribution of pt.
We iterate the map in (12) for t steps with initial condition 1/2, record the last
value pt, and repeat the procedure for N independent runs. As displayed in the
right panel of Figure 4, our economy exhibits momentum in the short-run, namely
Φt+j−1(j) is positive for low values of j. As j increases Φt+j−1(j) decreases. The
expected return becomes negative around j = 10, implying long-run reversal.
The intuition that underlies our analysis is that short-term momentum and
long-term reversal are due to the interplay between two forces: the dividend pos-
itive autocorrelation that generates momentum (continuation effect) and the ex-
treme and persistent mispricing that generates reversal (reversal effect). While the
continuation effect is constant with respect to j, the reversal effect increases with
j, since for a larger j the mispricing becomes higher. Hence for low values of j
the continuation effect overwhelms the reversal effect and the result is short-term
momentum. Conversely, for large values of j, the reversal effect prevails and the
outcome is long-term reversal.
The presence of both momentum and reversal can be explained considering
agents relative wealth dynamics, the dividend process, and agents’ diverse beliefs.
First of all notice that when a good state arrives, the agent who is investing the
most in that asset increases her wealth, generating a positive price variation and,
provided the asset is not heavily mispriced, a positive excess return. In the case
of bad states, the opposite occurs. The positive autocorrelation after good news
implies that probability of observing a variation of agents’ wealth with a given
sign after a variation of the same sign is higher than a variation of opposite sign.
This implies that the excess expected return has the same sign of the previous
excess return, implying momentum in the short-run. Contrarily, when we consider
long series of states of the same type, we have, both in the case of good or bad
states, situations of extreme mispricing because one of the two agents has almost
all the wealth and prices converge to her beliefs. Here, provided beliefs are diverse
enough to guarantee long-run heterogeneity (R2−R3), it is the poorest agent who
is favored. By investing a large enough fraction of her wealth in the underpriced
asset and a small enough fraction in the overpriced asset, she is able to grow more
in expectation, as ensured by (13) and (14). The result is an expected excess
return with opposite sign with respect to the previous ones and long-run reversal
to the mean.
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6 Implications
Here, we discuss the implications of our model along different dimensions. First, in
Section 6.1, we replicate some of the empirical tests of short-term momentum and
long-term reversal discussed in the literature using the synthetic data produced
by our model. In Section 6.2, we show how there exists a profitable portfolio that,
without resorting to short-selling, can provide a positive expected excess return in
every period. In Section 6.3, we demonstrate that, when short-selling is allowed, it
is possible to build a zero-cost portfolio strategy with positive expected payoffs in
every period. Finally in Section 6.4 we explore the sensitivity of momentum and
reversal effects to changes in beliefs dispersion and dividend autocorrelation.
6.1 Replication of Empirical Results
Having two assets in the economy allows to investigate whether our model is able to
replicate the performances of the Winners and Losers portfolios found by empirical
literature. In particular, we consider the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler
(1985) and apply it to the synthetic data produced by the model.
We start by establishing a length J for the formation period, a length H for
the performance period, and the total number of formation periods N . Then we
numerically iterate the map in (12) for T = J×N+H periods starting with initial
condition11 p0 = 1/2 and compute for any time step t = 1, 2, . . . , T the abnormal
return of each asset k defined as
ARk,t = rk,t − r1,t + r2,t
2
.
For each formation period n = 1, . . . , N , we compute the cumulative return of
each asset k in that formation period as
CUk,n =
nJ∑
τ=(n−1)J+1
ARk,τ .
During the same time steps we rank the two assets on the basis of their cumulative
return and assign them either to the Winners portfolio (W) or to the Losers portfo-
lio (L). The Winners portfolio built after the n-th formation period buys asset 1 if
CU1,n > CU2,n and asset 2 if CU2,n > CU1,n. The Losers portfolio does the oppo-
site. Then we evaluate the performance of the two portfolios during the following
H periods computing the cumulative abnormal return for each h = 1, 2, . . . , H.
Using the subscript w to indicate the winner asset and the subscript l to indicate
11Different initial conditions do not affect the results.
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the loser one, the cumulative abnormal returns for each time step h of the n-th
performance period read
CARWn,h =
nJ+h∑
τ=nJ+1
ARw,τ , CAR
L
n,h =
nJ+h∑
τ=nJ+1
ARl,τ .
De Bondt and Thaler (1985), relying on a wide cross-section of assets, prescribes
to build Winners and Losers portfolio considering only those assets that have
extreme cumulative returns with respect to such cross-section. Having only two
assets in our economy, we reproduce such feature using the time series dimension
instead of the cross-section one. Knowing the time distribution of cumulative
returns, we consider the performance of the two portfolios only after formation
periods in which the cumulative return of one asset is below the first quartile (and
thus it contributes to the loser portfolio) or above the third quartile (and thus
it contributes to the winner portfolio). Naming M the set of formation periods
for which the condition is respected, whose cardinality is N/2 given the use of
quartiles, we compute the average cumulative abnormal return of each portfolio
ACARWh =
∑
n∈M
CARWn,h
N/2
, ACARLh =
∑
n∈M
CARLn,h
N/2
,
and the relative standard errors
SEWh =
√√√√ ∑n∈M (CARWn,h − ACARWh )2
N/2(N/2− 1) , SE
L
h =
√√√√ ∑n∈M (CARLn,h − ACARLh)2
N/2(N/2− 1) .
Since in our model dividend are paid in each time step, we assume that one
period of our economy corresponds to a quarter. Thus, with J between 12 and
20 we replicate the exercise of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), while with
J between 1 and 4 we replicate the exercise of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,
2001). H is kept fixed to 20 such that we can observe both short-run and long-
run performances. We also calibrate the parameters of the model in such a way
that our risk free rate is close to the average 3-month risk free rate recorded
in real data and the average dividend yield of our model matches the average
quarterly dividend yield recorded empirically.12 Following such procedure we set
δ = 0.99, λ = 0.1, pi1 = 0.95, pi2 = 0.05. Finally, we choose N = 100000. Figure
12Sources of the data: http://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-dividend-yield/ for the divi-
dend yield (whose yearly average is divided by 4 to get the quarterly one) and http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html for the 1-month risk
free rate (which is compounded in order to find the 3-month one).
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Figure 5: Left panel: J = 2. Right panel: J = 12. Error bars are set to three
standard errors away from the estimates.
5 shows the results of the exercise for J = 2 and J = 12. As one can notice from
the left panel, when the portfolios are built looking only at the last 2 periods, in
the 5 periods following the formation date the Winners portfolio outperforms the
Losers portfolio in a statistically significant way, matching quite well the empirical
results of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001). Moreover, in the subsequent periods
the Loser portfolio overcomes the Winners portfolio, reproducing the result of
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) about the long-run reversion of momentum profits.
In the right panel, instead, one notices that building the two portfolios on the basis
of a formation period of length 12 the Losers portfolio is able to outperform the
Winners one in a statistically significant way after 1 period from the formation
date. This matches the results of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) about long-run
reversion.
6.2 Momentum-Reversal Strategy with Short-Selling Con-
straint
When the price process is determined by a representative agent with rational ex-
pectations, as we consider in Section 4.1, fair pricing holds and all assets have the
same expected return equal to the risk free rate. Thus, any portfolio built using
those assets has also zero expected excess return. Provided investors have hetero-
geneous beliefs and heterogeneity is persistent, the situation is different. Indeed,
we have just seen that Winner or Losers potfolios lead to significant profits/losses.
In this and the next subsection we show how to improve upon these portfolios.
We start with porfolios that do not allow for short selling. Using the infor-
mation provided by Figure 3 and considering the symmetry of asset 2s expected
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pt < 1/2− λ 1/2− λ < pt < 1/2 + λ pt > 1/2 + λ
st = 1 buy asset 1 buy asset 1 buy asset 2
st = 2 buy asset 1 buy asset 2 buy asset 2
Table 1: Momentum-reversal strategy implemented at time t with short-selling
constraint.
returns, one can implement the profitable portfolio strategy of Table 1. Calling
Rt+1 the expected excess return of such strategy at t+ 1, one has
E[Rt+1|pt, st] =
=

1− δ
δ
(1− pt)(1/2 + λ− pt)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt < 1/2 + λ and st = 1 ,
1− δ
δ
(1− pt)(1/2 + λ− pt)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt < 1/2− λ and st = 2 ,
1− δ
δ
pt(pt − 1/2− λ)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt > 1/2 + λ and st = 1 ,
1− δ
δ
pt(pt − 1/2 + λ)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt > 1/2− λ and st = 2 .
Notice that, exploiting both short-term momentum and long-term reversal, the
portfolio has positive expected return between period t and period t+ 1 for every
σ without resorting to short selling. When 1/2 − λ < pt < 1/2 + λ the portfolio
exploits short-term momentum: given the sign of the last return (implied by the
state realized at t) it goes long in the asset whose news are positive. When, instead,
the price goes outside the interval (1/2−λ, 1/2+λ), the portfolio exploits long-run
reversal: it buys the asset that is underpriced and has positive expected return,
i.e. when pt goes below 1/2− λ it buys asset 1 while it buys asset 2 when pt goes
above 1/2 + λ.
By providing a positive expected next period return for every round of trading,
such strategy outperforms both the Winners and the Losers portfolio described in
the previous section. Figure 6 compares the expected cumulated excess returns
after h rounds of trading of strategies implemented in any τ = t, t+1, . . . , t+h−1:
A1 buys only asset 1, A2 buys only asset 2, and 2AMR is the portfolio strategy in
Table 1. For any level of pt and for any st, the expected cumulated excess return
of 2AMR is larger than or equal to the ones entailed by A1 or A2. This implies
that 2AMR does better than any possible one-asset Winner or Loser portfolio.
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Figure 6: Comparison of expected cumulated excess returns after h rounds of
trading of a strategy that buys only asset 1 (A1) and of the portfolio strategy in
table 1 (2AMR). Values of parameters used in the picture: δ = 0.95, λ = 0.1,
pi1 = 0.8, pi2 = 0.2, h = 8.
6.3 Zero-cost Momentum-Reversal Strategy
Having two risky assets in our economy and allowing for short-selling, one can
design zero-cost trading strategies with positive pay-off in expectation. These
portfolios are not arbitrages in that pay-offs might be positive or negative, but
could be considered as statistical arbitrages: if the same trade is repeated over
and over again, then, by the law of large numbers, the realized profit is positive
even if the strategy has zero cost.13
Indeed, inspired by the strategy found in Section 6.2, consider the portfolio
13Despite agent demand is not directly derived by an inter-temporal utility maximization, no
arbitrages are possible in our model, see also Bottazzi et al. (2017).
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pt < 1/2− λ 1/2− λ < pt < 1/2 + λ pt > 1/2 + λ
st = 1 buy 1/P1,t of asset 1 buy 1/P1,t of asset 1 sell 1/P1,t of asset 1
sell 1/P2,t of asset 2 sell 1/P2,t of asset 2 buy 1/P2,t of asset 2
st = 2 buy 1/P1,t of asset 1 sell 1/P1,t of asset 1 sell 1/P1,t of asset 1
sell 1/P2,t of asset 2 buy 1/P2,t of asset 2 buy 1/P2,t of asset 2
Table 2: Zero-cost momentum-reversal strategy implemented at time t.
strategy in table 2. Calling R′t+1 its payoff, one has
E[R′t+1|pt, st] =
=

1− δ
δ
1/2 + λ− pt
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt < 1/2 + λ and st = 1 ,
1− δ
δ
1/2− λ− pt
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt < 1/2− λ and st = 2 ,
1− δ
δ
pt − 1/2− λ
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt > 1/2 + λ and st = 1 ,
1− δ
δ
pt − 1/2 + λ
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) > 0 if pt > 1/2− λ and st = 2 .
Such zero-cost portfolio amplifies the good performance of the strategy in table
1 exploiting short-selling. The intuition that underlies such result is again the
presence of momentum and reversal in the market, together with the price bounds
{1/2 − λ, 1/2 + λ}, and the fact that in our economy the two assets have anti-
correlated returns and prices. When pt < 1/2 − λ or pt > 1/2 + λ, one asset is
overpriced while the other is underpriced, hence one can get a positive expected
payoff with zero cost selling the overpriced asset and buying the underpriced one.
In this way the strategy is suggesting a Losers-minus-Winners portfolio which
exploits reversal. When assets are neither overpriced nor underpriced, 1/2 − λ <
pt < 1/2+λ, then it relies on the information provided by the last realized state of
the word in order to build a Winners-minus-Losers portfolio which performs well
because of momentum.
6.4 Dispersion in Beliefs and Dividend Autocorrelation
Having computed expected returns as a function of the economy parameters, we
can analyze what happens to short-term momentum and long-term reversal when
these parameters change. Let us start considering what happens when beliefs
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Figure 7: First panel: φt+j−1(j, pt). Second panel: Φt+j−1(j). The dashed line
represents Φ∞.
are less dispersed. In Figure 7, we take the same parametrization considered in
Figure 4 but modify agents’ beliefs to pi1 = 0.65 and pi2 = 0.3. Both momentum
and reversal decrease in magnitude. The result is general. For j = 1 one has
∂φt(1, pt)
∂pi1
> 0 and
∂φt(1, pt)
∂pi2
< 0 .
If an agent beliefs become more extreme, then the short-term momentum increases.
For the long-run one gets
∂φ∞(pt)
∂pi1
< 0 and
∂φ∞(pt)
∂pi2
> 0
show that also long-term reversal gets stronger when agents’ disagreement in-
creases.
Some contributions have explored the relation between beliefs dispersion and
both momentum and reversal. According to Hong and Stein (1999) “it seems
plausible that information about small firms gets out slowly” and the same should
hold for analyst coverage, thus one can think that stocks related to small firms
and/or to firms with low coverage should induce agents to end up with beliefs that
are more dispersed than with large firms and/or high analyst coverage. Under
this assumption the empirical results of Hong et al. (2000) and Daniel and Titman
(1999) agree with the analysis presented here. Verardo (2009) considers explicitly
the impact of beliefs dispersion on momentum. She finds a positive link between
beliefs dispersion and momentum profits, thus confirming our finding for what
concerns short-term momentum.
The analysis just performed concerning beliefs can be repeated in terms of the
autocorrelation coefficient λ. In Figure 8, we take the same parametrization used
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Figure 8: First panel: φt+j−1(j, pt). Second panel: Φt+j−1(j). The dashed line
represents Φ∞.
in Figure 4 but increase the value of λ to 0.15. Both a stronger momentum in the
short-run and weaker reversal in the long-run emerge. The result is quite general,
indeed one has
∂φt(1, pt)
∂λ
> 0 and
∂φ∞(pt)
∂λ
> 0 .
Thus, when the probability of having the same state of the current period becomes
higher, one has larger short-term momentum and (because of its negative sign) a
lower long-term reversal. About this point there are not, up to our knowledge,
contributions that highlight such link either in theoretical or empirical terms. We
leave this investigation for future research.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we show that, when financial returns are the result of persistent
speculative exchanges due to beliefs heterogeneity, two well-known empirical facts
are recovered: short-run momentum and long-run reversal. In our model the
source of the two phenomena can be explained considering the following three
ingredients: the positive autocorrelation of the dividend process, agents’ relative
wealth dynamics, and agents’ diverse beliefs. The basic mechanism that underlies
the relative wealth dynamics is that when good states related to an asset arrive, i.e.
the asset pays a dividend, the agent who is investing the most in that asset increases
her wealth, generating a positive price variation and thus a positive excess return.
In the case of bad states the opposite occurs. This, together with the positive
autocorrelation of the dividend process, implies that the probability of observing
a variation of agents wealth with a given sign after a variation of the same sign
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is higher than a variation of opposite sign. The result is short-run momentum.
However, when we consider long series of states of the same type, the fact that
agents invest based on non correct and heterogeneous beliefs generates extreme
mispricing. In particular, the overpriced asset has negative expected returns while
the underpriced asset has positive expected returns, leading to long-term reversal.
The process never settles because under mispricing it is the poorest agent who is
favored: she is investing a large fraction of her wealth in the underpriced asset
and a small fraction in the overpriced asset and thus, provided her portfolio is
diverse enough, she is able to grow more in expectation. This implies that the
price eventually reverts back to the mean and returns exhibit long-run reversal.
Thus, in our model, the occurrence of momentum and reversal is not linked to
investors’ under- and over- reaction as in the behavioral finance literature: our
analysis unveils a complementary source for the two effects.
Such source proves effective in reproducing the superior performance of a Win-
ners portfolio with respect to a Losers portfolio over short lags and of a Losers
portfolio with respect to a Winners portfolio over distant lags. Improving upon
these strategies, we also show how to use momentum and reversal price bounds to
build strategies that are profitable, in expectation, in every period, both when a
short-selling constraint holds and when it does not. Finally, our analysis implies
that dividend autocorrelation is positively related to momentum and negatively
related to reversal whereas diversity of beliefs is positively related to both momen-
tum and reversal.
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A Proof of Proposition 4.1
Since 0 < pi2 < pi1 < 1, there exists a ε > 0 such that ε ≤ pi2 < pi1 ≤ 1− ε. Let
zt = log
wt
1− wt = log
pt − pi2
pi1 − pt
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From (12), given that p ∈ [pi2, pi1], it is easy to show that for st+1 = 1 it is
0 < zt+1 − zt < log 1− ε
ε
and for st+1 = 2 it is
log
ε
1− ε < zt+1 − zt < 0 .
Since zt+1 − zt is continuous in p, these inequalities imply that {zt} is a bounded
increments process with finite positive and negative increments as defined in Bot-
tazzi and Dindo (2015). With i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j define the two quantities
A+j =
(
1
2
+ λ
)
log
(
δpij + (1− δ)pii
pij
)
+
(
1
2
− λ
)
log
(
1− δpij − (1− δ)pii
1− pij
)
and
A−j =
(
1
2
− λ
)
log
(
δpij + (1− δ)pii
pij
)
+
(
1
2
+ λ
)
log
(
1− δpij − (1− δ)pii
1− pij
)
.
Call µ(z, s) = E[zt+1|zt = z, st = s] − z and notice that limz→+∞ µ(z, 1) = −A+1 ,
limz→+∞ µ(z, 2) = −A−1 , limz→−∞ µ(z, 1) = A+2 and limz→−∞ µ(z, 1) = A−2 . Thus,
if the conditions stated in the first part of the Proposition are satisfied, Theorem
2.2 of Bottazzi and Dindo (2015) applies, the process {zt} is persistent and both
agents survive. The last statement of the Proposition about the limits of pt follows
from the finite positive and negative increments of {zt}.
B Proof of Corollary 4.1
Conditions (13) and (14) can be written as
ρ
(
1
2
+ λ, δpij + (1− δ)pii, pij
)
> 0 ,
ρ
(
1
2
− λ, δpij + (1− δ)pii, pij
)
> 0 ,
with
ρ(pi, pi′, pi′′) = pi log
pi′
pi′′
+ (1− pi) log 1− pi
′
1− pi′′ .
By Jensen’s inequality, it is
log
(
1 +
(pi′′ − pi′)(pi′′ − pi)
pi′′(1− pi′′)
)
> ρ(pi, pi′, pi′′) .
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Thus, if the right hand side is positive, the argument of the logarithm in the left
hand side must be greater than one. Substituting the values for pi, pi′ and pi′′ and
remembering that δ ∈ (0, 1), this implies
(pij − pii)(pij − 1
2
− λ) > 0 and (pij − pii)(pij − 1
2
+ λ) > 0
which, remembering that 0 < pi1 < pi2 < 1, is equivalent to the assertion.
C Proof of Propositions 5.2
From the price process (12) and Lemma 5.1 we have
E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pt] =
1− δ
δ
(1− pt)(1/2 + λ− pt)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) , (15)
E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pt] =
1− δ
δ
(1− pt)(1/2− λ− pt)
pt(1− pt)− δ(pi1 − pt)(pt − pi2) . (16)
Averaging with respect the the invariant distribution of the states on the world pi∗
gives
φt(1, pt) =
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pt]−
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pt]
which gives the required expression. The fact that φt(1, pt) > 0 for all (t, σ) and for
all pt ∈ (pi2, pi1) implies Φt(1) > 0 for all (t, σ), irrespective of the price distribution.
D Proof of Propositions 5.3
From (15)-(16) in the proof above and Lemma 5.1, irrespective of the value of pt
one has
lim
j→∞
E[r1,t+j|R+t+j−1(j), pt] = E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pi1] =
1− δ
δ
1/2 + λ− pi1
pi1
,
lim
j→∞
E[r1,t+j|R−t+j−1(j), pt] = E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pi2] =
1− δ
δ
1/2− λ− pi2
pi2
.
Averaging with respect the the invariant distribution of the states on the world pi∗
gives
φ∞(pt) =
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R+t (1), pi1]−
1
2
E[r1,t+1|R−t (1), pi2] ,
which gives the required expression. Notice that this expression does not depend
on pt, hence Φ∞ = φ∞(pt).
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